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Нобелевская премия по экономике
2012 |
Элвин
Рот
(1951)
За теорию стабильного распределения и практики устройства рынков |
Биография | Библиография |
Roth A.E. The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives // Mathematics of Operations Research. — 1982. — Т. 7. — С. 617—628.
Roth A.E. The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory // Journal of Political Economy. — 1984. — Т. 92. — С. 991—1016.
Roth A.E. Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching // Econometrica. — 1984. — Т. 52. — С. 47—57.
Roth A.E. The College Admission Problem is Not Equivalent to the Marriage Problem // Journal of Economic Theory. — 1985. — Т. 36. — С. 277—288.
Roth A.E. Two-Sided Matching Markets // Econometrica. — 1986. — Т. 54. — С. 425—427.
Roth A.E., Sotomayor M. The College Admission Problem Revisited // Econometrica. — 1989. — Т. 57. — С. 559—570.
Roth A.E., Vande Vate J.H. Random Paths to Stability in Two Sided Matching // Econometrica. — 1990. — Т. 58. — С. 1475—1480.
Roth A.E., Rothblum U.G. Truncation Strategies in Matching Markets — In Search of Advice for Participants // Econometrica. — 1999. — Т. 67. — С. 21—43.
Roth A.E., S?nmez T., ?nver M.U. Kidney Exchange // Quarterly Journal of Economics. — 2004. — Т. 119. — С. 457—488.
Roth A.E. Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions // International Journal of Game Theory. — 2008. — Т. 36. — С. 537—569.
Roth A.E., Sotomayor M. Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis. — Cambridge, N. Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1990. — (Econometric Society Monographs). — ISBN 0-521-39015-X